By Dean Enrique BUKO dela Cruz, Jr.
In October 2026, the Supreme Court delivered a landmark judgment in the consolidated cases led by Representative Edcel C. Lagman v. The Congress of the Philippines.
Writing for the En Banc, Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen opened the ruling with a stark reminder of the human cost of public finance, emphasizing that every peso collected in taxes represents labor rendered, needs deferred, and sacrifices endured by the Filipino people—sacrifices the General Appropriations Act must honor.
With this milestone decision, the High Court invalidated major portions of recent national budgets, fundamentally reshaping how Congress legislates, manages, and executes public funds.
Unprogrammed Appropriations
To understand why the Supreme Court intervened, one must first see how the national budget preparation process is constitutionally designed to work.
The budget process originates exclusively with the Executive branch. Each year, the President submits the National Expenditure Program alongside the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing. These documents outline the administration’s planned spending aligned with anticipated tax and non-tax revenues. Once submitted, Congress exercises its constitutional “power of the purse” to review, debate, amend, and enact the General Appropriations Act.
A standard national budget is structured into two main funding categories: programmed appropriations and unprogrammed appropriations. Programmed appropriations form the core of the national budget, covering regular government operations, agency salaries, and guaranteed infrastructure projects backed by predictable, expected national revenues.
A key constitutional nuance is that the Supreme Court did not declare unprogrammed appropriations unconstitutional per se. The Court recognized that unprogrammed funds serve a legitimate, necessary fiscal function as standby authorizations. They are designed to give the President limited operational flexibility to respond dynamically to unforeseen global or domestic contingencies without returning to Congress for a separate supplemental law.
Under the new rules the Court laid down, unprogrammed appropriations can still be validly included in the national budget if they meet strict constitutional parameters.
First, they must act as narrow, contingent standby authorizations rather than guaranteed spending pools.
Second, they are permissible primarily for specific, high-priority contingent needs—such as foreign-assisted projects that are still under negotiation during budget preparation but are highly likely to be finalized during the budget execution year.
Third, Congress must prescribe explicit, line-item standards and clear prioritization rules whenever multiple purposes are listed under unprogrammed funds.
Finally, unprogrammed allocations must remain strictly within the national fiscal framework submitted by the President, ensuring that they never serve as a mechanism to bypass spending limits.
Illegal Insertions
Despite this legal design, Congress systematically distorted the unprogrammed funds mechanism in recent budget cycles.
The primary site of this distortion was the Bicameral Conference Committee—a joint panel tasked with reconciling differences between the House and Senate versions of the budget bill. Operating behind closed doors, lawmakers executed massive budget reallocations without public scrutiny, committee discussions, or official written transcripts.
Lawmakers routinely defunded core, long-term strategic projects the President had placed under regular programmed appropriations—such as vital foreign-assisted railway systems and mass transit infrastructure—and moved them into the standby unprogrammed pool.
This artificial maneuver freed up hundreds of billions of pesos in guaranteed, programmed fiscal space. Lawmakers then redirected these guaranteed funds into district infrastructure projects, localized allocations, and politicians’ discretionary social welfare initiatives like AKAP and TUPAD.
To keep the defunded national infrastructure projects alive on paper, Congress heavily inflated the standby unprogrammed pool far beyond the President’s original proposal.
In the 2024 budget, Congress added a staggering ₱449.5 billion to unprogrammed funds. In the 2025 budget, Congress similarly added ₱17.99 billion to the Department of Public Works and Highways Special Road Fund, alongside ₱12.75 billion in unauthorized increases across agency Special Accounts in the General Fund.
To enable the rapid spending of these bloated standby allocations, Congress inserted relaxed release conditions into the special provisions of the 2026 budget bill.
Instead of requiring the entire country to achieve a total aggregate national revenue surplus before unlocking standby money, the new provisions allowed the Executive to release unprogrammed funds whenever an individual non-tax revenue line item exceeded its target or when any new revenue source arose. This created an artificial revenue surplus, enabling massive off-budget spending even as the national government remained in an overall fiscal deficit.
The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court declared Republic Act 11975 (the 2024 General Appropriations Act) and Republic Act 12116 (the 2025 General Appropriations Act) unconstitutional, while permanently enjoining Special Provisions 1(a) and 1(b) of Chapter XLIII of Republic Act 12314 (the 2026 General Appropriations Act) based on four legal grounds:
- Violation of the Constitutional Budget Ceiling: Article VI, Section 25(1) of the 1987 Constitution explicitly prohibits Congress from increasing the total appropriations recommended by the President in the budget proposal. The Supreme Court ruled that this constitutional spending cap applies to the aggregate sum of both programmed and unprogrammed appropriations combined. By adding ₱449.5 billion in unprogrammed funds in 2024 and ₱17.99 billion to the Special Road Fund in 2025 without making equal reductions elsewhere, Congress illegally breached the presidential spending ceiling.
- Erosion of Deficit Neutrality and Fiscal Discipline: The Court held that unprogrammed funds must strictly preserve deficit neutrality. Allowing standby funds to be unlocked by isolated sectoral non-tax wins rather than a verified, aggregate national revenue surplus violates Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution, distorts national debt targets, and fosters fiscal indiscipline.
- Illegality of Lumpsums and Post-Enactment Discretion: The Court struck down specific allocations within unprogrammed funds, most notably the “Strengthening Assistance for Government Infrastructure and Social Programs” (SAGIP). SAGIP operated as a broad, multi-billion-peso lump-sum repository that gave the Executive post-enactment discretion to choose which projects to fund—from local flood control to emergency social relief—long after the budget bill was signed into law. The Court declared this an unconstitutional abdication of legislative authority and a clear violation of the non-delegation doctrine.
- Bicameral Overreach and Transparency Violations: The Court penalized the Bicameral Conference Committee for making multi-billion-peso additions without procedural authority. The committee produced no official transcripts, records, or written justifications for its sweeping budget changes, violating both chambers’ internal rules and basic standards of public accountability.
The Progression of Previous Rulings
To understand the full significance of the 2026 Lagman Ruling, view it as the culmination of a decade-long judicial evolution over the power of the purse.
In Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (2013), the Supreme Court dismantled legislative overreach by striking down the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
Belgica established that once the budget becomes law, the legislative phase ends, and lawmakers cannot retain post-enactment authority to select local projects or direct budget releases.
In Araullo v. Aquino III (2014), the Court addressed executive overreach under the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP). Araullo ruled that the Executive cannot pool cross-border “savings” or fund line items completely missing from the GAA. Crucially, Araullo laid down the rule that unprogrammed funds cannot be released based on individual non-tax surpluses; total aggregate national revenue collections must first exceed aggregate targets.
In Aquilino Pimentel III v. House of Representatives (2025), the Court prohibited the executive branch from harvesting the reserve balances and surpluses of Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs)—specifically PhilHealth’s ₱89.9 billion surplus—to finance unprogrammed standby allocations. Pimentel affirmed that corporate reserves cannot be treated as a general piggy bank or a substitute for genuine national revenue growth.
The recent 2026 Lagman ruling completes this constitutional framework. While Belgica and Araullo penalized illegal actions during the budget execution stage after the budget was signed, Lagman intervenes directly at the enactment stage. It shows how Congress used structural budget math, bicameral transfers, and artificial fiscal space to bypass constitutional caps during drafting.
The Motion for Reconsideration
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is preparing a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on behalf of the administration. The OSG’s appeal will likely argue that unprogrammed funds provide essential economic shock absorbers and that requiring an absolute aggregate national revenue surplus before unlocking standby funds restricts executive responsiveness during crises. The OSG will also re-assert that standby funds do not constitute a true ceiling breach because their release remains contingent on future revenues.
Historically, the Supreme Court rarely reverses En Banc constitutional decisions. When the executive branch appealed the invalidation of the DAP in Araullo (2015), the Court stood firm on core constitutional principles while offering modest operational adjustments. A similar trajectory is anticipated here.
If the Supreme Court grants a partial Motion for Reconsideration, it will likely issue a structured legal compromise that preserves its constitutional victory while preventing state paralysis:
- Prospective-Only Enforcement: The Court may grant a prospective grace period, allowing the Executive branch an operational window to wind down or complete active projects without a retroactive freeze on government books.
- Expanded Good-Faith Shield for Civil Servants: The Court could refine its liability guidelines to protect regular civil servants, agency accountants, and rank-and-file auditors from immediate prosecution, keeping legal scrutiny focused on primary policy architects.
- Narrowed Emergency Release Triggers: While maintaining that general unprogrammed releases require aggregate national revenue targets to be met, the Court may clarify dynamic formulas allowing immediate standby releases for hyper-specific emergencies, such as national natural disasters or approved foreign loan disbursements.
Summary of the New Rules on Government Spending
The Supreme Court’s milestone decision establishes five definitive rules for Philippine public finance:
First, the constitutional budget ceiling under Article VI, Section 25(1) is absolute and all-inclusive. The combined total of programmed and unprogrammed appropriations cannot exceed the President’s recommended ceiling in the National Expenditure Program.
Second, unprogrammed appropriations remain constitutional only as narrow, contingent standby authorizations. They can still be included in the national budget for legitimate standby purposes, such as foreign-assisted projects, provided they include clear line-item standards and explicit prioritization rules.
Third, lump-sum standby allocations are unconstitutional. Broad funding pools like SAGIP that grant post-enactment project selection authority to the Executive violate the non-delegation doctrine.
Fourth, release triggers for unprogrammed funds must preserve true deficit neutrality. Standby funds cannot be unlocked through isolated non-tax surpluses or sectoral wins unless total aggregate national revenue collections surpass total target projections.
Fifth, bicameral conference proceedings must be fully transparent. The Bicameral Conference Committee cannot make unrecorded insertions; it must maintain detailed written records and comparative transcripts explaining every budget modification.
A Final Note
For decades, unprogrammed funds were used as a source of kickbacks. Niraraket at pinagkakakitaan ang pondo ng bayan. With this landmark decision, the Supreme Court sent a clear message: Public funds are for public purpose—plain and simple.
Anyone who misuses the people’s money should know that the law will eventually catch up, and accountability will follow. Every single peso comes from the hard work and sacrifice of the Filipino people, so it must be spent with complete honesty and transparency.
Dapat laging piliin na gumawa ng tama, may bantay man o wala. Dahil sa huli, dapat nating tandaan na ang paglilingkod sa bayan ay hindi dapat pinagkakakitaan. Ang tunay na public service ay serbisyo, hindi negosyo.
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Enrique BUKO dela Cruz, Jr. is the Dean of the College of Law of Baliuag University. He earned his Juris Doctor with honors from UST Manila and his LLM with Distinction from the London Metropolitan University, UK, as a British Government Chevening Scholar (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office) in 2005. He took up a Master’s in Public Management degree from the Ateneo School of Government in 2001. He completed an Executive Program on Leadership at the KSG, Harvard University in 2002 and the Future Leaders Program from the National University of Singapore (NUS) Business School in 2022.