Mar 3, 2021 @ 18:51
SC: Elected execs can no longer raise ‘condonation’ if re-elected on or after April 12, 2016
Elected public officials can no longer raise as defense the doctrine of condonation if they were re-elected on or after April 12, 2016, the Supreme Court on Wednesday clarified.
Under the condonation doctrine or “Aguinaldo doctrine,” a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of his past misconduct.
But in a latest ruling in GR No. 237330, Madreo v. Bayron; GR No. 237579, Ombudsman v. Bayron, November 3, 2020 written by Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, the SC upheld the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of administrative charges against a Lucilo R. Bayron, former mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, and his son Karl Bayron.
Lucilo, who won as mayor in 2013, entered into a contract of services with his son, Karl Bayron, engaging him as Project Manager for Bantay Puerto-VIP Security Task Force, with a monthly compensation of P16,000 from July 2013 to December 2013.
On the complaint of one Aldrin Madreo, both were found administratively liable and were meted out the penalty of dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman in 2016.
Lucilo won in the recall elections in 2015. During the May 2016 local elections, he was re-elected as mayor.
In denying the petition of Madreo and the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court ruled that the abandonment of the Aguinaldo doctrine in Carpio-Morales was clear that the abandonment shall be applied prospectively from April 12, 2016.
The Court, however, stressed that the defense of condonation doctrine is no longer available if the official’s re-election happens on or after April 12, 2016.
“With the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio-Morales, which became final on 12 April 2016, any re-elections of public officials on said date and onwards no longer have the effect of condoning their previous misconduct, ” the SC said.
The Court also held that the condonation docrine is applicable through a recall election. “A recall elections presupposes the same collective resolution of the constituents to condone the alleged misconduct. This is no different from re-election by regular election.”
Thus, it ruled that the doctrine of condonation is applicable to Lucilo’s case by reason of his re-election during the 2015 recall elections.
However, it stressed that the doctrine cannot be extended to Lucilo’s re-election in the May 2016 elections because the doctrine, by then, had
already been abandoned and his re-election no longer had the effect of condoning his previous misconduct.
In November 2016, the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding the Bayrons administratively liable for serious dishonesty and grave misconduct and meted the penalty of dismissal.
It also found probable cause to indict both for Falsification of Public Document since the contract declared that Karl “is not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity with the Hiring Authority.”
The Bayrons filed a motion for reconsideration and pending its resolution, Lucilo filed before the CA a Petition for Review in 2017, alleging, among others, that with his re-election in the 2015 recall polls and 2016 local elections, he can no longer be removed from office by reason of the condonation doctrine.
The Ombudsman eventually modified its ruling and found them liable only for simple dishonesty and meted a penalty of three month suspension.
When complainant Madreo subsequently filed his own MR, the Ombudsman reconsidered and set aside anew its ruling which in effect reinstated Bayron’s dismissal from service.
In August 2017, the CA granted Bayron’s petition and dismissed the charges against him on the ground that the Aguinaldo doctrine is applicable to his case.
When the CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the Ombudsman and Madreo, the latter elevated the matter to the High Court.
Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta and eight Associate Justices concurred with Justice Delos Santos’ ponencia.
Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen wrote a separate dissenting opinion.Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier took no part.#